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The Law and the “Law”: 
Two Kinds of Legal Space in Late-Qing China
Eric Schluessel
The Qing (1636-1911) produced a substantial corpus of codiied law that 
served to routinize many of the imperial government’s tasks in maintaining 
peace and social order, among them the procedure for prosecuting and executing 
subjects found to have committed capital crimes. 1 Early in the empire’s 
development, however, certain Ming loyalists articulated an ideological stance 
against codiied law together with their anti-Manchuism. One, Huang Zongxi, 
wrote of Qing codiied law and Chinese codiied moralism as opposing varieties 
of “law” (fa). In the 1840s, his writings and those of his contemporaries 
inspired members of the “statecraft” (jingshi) school to articulate a new 
imaginary of chaos, according to which expanding the geographical reach 
of moralism at the expense of codiied law was necessary to bringing order 
to the world. I will argue here that the crises of the mid-nineteenth century 
provided an opportunity for this group to implement policies that carved out 
a new geography of sovereignty within Qing imperial space. Their idea of 
sovereignty was predicated on the supremacy of moralism over codiied law.
This article concerns a technique of politics and law that provincial Han 
Chinese elites appropriated in the mid-nineteenth century, “execution on the 
1. This article was irst presented at the workshop “The Place of the Law in the Late 
Chinese Empire” in Lyon on 12 May 2015. I am very grateful to Jérôme Bourgon 
for inviting me to participate and for the comments the paper received. Research 
was conducted on an International Dissertation Research Fellowship from the Social 
Sciences Research Council.
 In order to conserve space, archival and published documents will be cited according 
to the following format:
 First Historical Archive, Beijing: “FHA (document number) (reign date).”
 National Palace Museum, Taipei: “NPM (document number) (reign date).”
 Gongzhong dang Guangxu chao zouzhe (Taibei: Guoli gugong bowuyuan, 1973-
1975): “GZD (volume number) (page number).”
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spot” (jiudi zhengfa). “Execution on the spot,” as I will detail further below, 
entailed a suspension of the statutory procedure for capital punishment: as 
has been well documented, any execution of a criminal technically needed 
to be approved by the emperor in Beijing. While amnesty was frequent, and 
much of the decision-making was certainly handled by the bureaucracy, 
nevertheless, the power to decide life and death rested symbolically with the 
sovereign. “Execution on the spot,” however, permitted provincial leaders, 
and even lower-ranking oficials or local gentry, to prosecute and execute a 
criminal and report the matter to Beijing after the fact. Although the practice 
was popularized during the Taiping crisis (1850-1864), “execution on the 
spot” was not merely an expedient measure, as its proponents argued. Rather, 
it became a routine practice in those provinces controlled by the new Han 
Chinese provincial leaders, notably in the far northwestern region of Xinjiang. 
Xinjiang was seen as the origin of the practice, and in the late Qing, it became 
the place where it persisted the longest and had the broadest implementation. 
Its example will serve to illustrate the basic ideas underlying “execution-on-
the-spot” and its purposes.
Studying law from the places it was suspended and negated opens up several 
useful perspectives, as certain legal theorists and critical legal historians have 
noted: in the purposeful, or even cynical, suspension of the law, we might see 
which agents are capable of doing so successfully and perceive more accurately 
those agents’ understandings of what law is or ought to be. 2 We can see in 
histories that are often construed in terms of “progress,” such as the emergence 
of modern China, the construction of new internal Others as legitimate targets of 
state violence. 3 Our attention is drawn to the instrumentalization of human life 
construed as intractably chaotic in service of the performance of sovereignty. 4 
Such an approach permits ine-grained comparison between empires on the 
basis of the spatial and legal imaginaries that inform their governments. 5 This 
article will explore these perspectives and offer avenues for further research.
Origins of the Statecraft Legal and Geographical Imaginary
In order to understand the statecraft imagination of law and space, let 
us begin with two inluential igures from the Ming-Qing transition: Huang 
Zongxi (1610-1695), whose discussion of law inluenced statecraft scholars’ 
2. Schmitt 2005: 97-98.
3. Agamben 2005: 2-5.
4. Mbembe 2003: 11-40.
5. Benton 2010: 6-9.
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anti-legal stance, and Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), whose revival in the 1830s 
provided a new geographical imaginary of order and chaos.
Huang Zongxi completed the Ming-yi daifang lu in 1663, following many 
years in armed resistance to the Manchu dynasty. 6 Huang’s goal was to bring 
the techniques of government from an imagined pre-dynastic past to bear 
on the problems of his chaotic age. Dynastic, codiied law (fa) was a central 
object of his critique: to Huang, the elaboration of imperial institutions since 
the Qin (221-206 BCE) had gradually constricted the agency of moral men, 
encouraged in its place the pursuit of self-interest, and consequently led to 
the articulation of ever more laws to compensate for emergent immorality in 
government. Huang dubbed such laws “illegal law” (fei fa zhi fa). In its place, 
he proposed the revival of “law without law” (wu fa zhi fa), the socio-moral 
order of humility and humaneness that Neo-Confucians located in the Zhou 
dynasty. According to Huang, the essence of that order was codiied in the 
Rites of Zhou (Zhouli), and the system of relationships and rituals described 
therein, the “law of one family, not of a dynasty” (yi jia zhi fa er fei tianxia zhi 
fa) had engendered a “spirit among men that went beyond the letter of the law” 
(fa wai zhi yi). Where a contemporary legal scholar might ind much to admire 
in the Qing’s accumulation of substatutes, a follower of Huang Zongxi would 
see the restriction of the genuine force of social ordering, his true “law” (fa) of 
Confucian moralism.
Wang Fuzhi was also a Ming loyalist who led violent resistance against 
the Qing. The experience inluenced his vision of civilization and barbarism 
in Chinese history. Wang wrote that the traditional and expansive boundaries 
of Chinese civilization (wen), as recorded in the Rites of Zhou, had been 
maintained by popular conformity to the socio-moral norms embodied by 
the “rites” (li). 7 Civilization’s boundaries later receded during the Song (960-
1279), when Northern Chinese observance of orthopraxy declined. The center 
of civilization’s essence shifted to the formerly barbarous South, where people 
had adopted the rites, and in the longer term, this allowed barbarism to prevail 
in the North, whence the Qing came. Not only would it be possible to restore 
Chinese civilization by reviving the rites in the North, Wang wrote, it was both 
necessary and good to impose the rites on Barbarians, force them to adopt 
Chinese writing and read the Classics, and so transform them. Barbarians, 
in this view, lived in a state of natural chaos beyond the geographical and 
cosmological boundaries of a civilizing inluence embodied by performance 
of the rites.
6. Translations from Huang 1993: 4-5, 97-99. Chinese text from Huang 1847: yuanfa.
7. Wiens 1969: 14; Wang 1988: ce 29, 3:16b, 17; v. 4, 1,437-1,438; v. 12, 534.
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The statecraft community around the Yuelu Academy in Changsha, Hunan, 
revived Wang’s writings in the 1830s. 8 His message and Huang Zongxi’s 
resonated powerfully both with the statecraft group’s views of government, 
political circumstances, and new intellectual interests. While statecraft thought 
had fallen out of the mainstream discourse of government during the irst 
decades of the Qing, it returned to prominence in the eighteenth century thanks 
to oficials such as Chen Hongmou (1696-1771). During Chen’s time as the 
governor of Yunnan and Shaanxi, he followed Huang Zongxi’s prescription for 
social ills by establishing schools to teach the rites and the Classics to everyone, 
including the poor and non-Han. 9 Chen intended to demonstrate that the rites 
could produce stable, peaceful societies in harmony with moral cosmology, 
and so did those who later studied at the Yuelu Academy, which Chen himself 
revived. Statecraft scholars developed a political philosophy centered around 
a deep-seated “faith in the concept of unfettered bureaucracy as the source of 
energy for the improvement of government,” 10 against impositions from the 
metropole, and nominally in support of the paternalistic leadership of local 
moral men.
In short, Qing-era statecraft came to oppose the “illegal law” of statutes 
and substatutes with the “law without law” of the rites. The statecraft group 
centered on the Yuelu Academy and Changsha associated the former with 
the long-term decline of Chinese civilization and with the elaborate Qing 
government, and the latter with the potential to revive civilization along the 
minimalist lines of an imagined pre-dynastic golden age. Their program sought 
to empower provincial and local oficials to restructure society to bring it into 
accordance with the rites and so do away with complex judicial procedures.
Execution-on-the-Spot
In the mid-nineteenth century, members of the statecraft group had the 
opportunity to put their anti-legal politics into practice. The next chapter in the 
history of “execution-on-the-spot” began with a violation of Qing sovereignty 
on the docks at Canton. Commissioner Lin Zexu (1775-1850), who was 
granted extensive authority in the matter of the British opium trade, in June 
1839 famously destroyed an enormous shipment of opium. Lin also imprisoned 
a number of foreign opium merchants and requested special authority from 
8. Platt 2007: 13-15, 24.
9. Huang 1993: 109; Rowe 2001: 424-25.
10. Polachek 1977: 18.
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Beijing to “execute them on the spot.” 11 He was denied, and instead was 
punished for his arrogation of authority, which was thought to have sparked off 
the Opium War, with exile to Ili. Ili, straddling today’s Northern Xinjiang and 
Kazakhstan, was on the opposite end of the Qing empire, and Lin’s exile was 
brief. Nevertheless, he successfully parlayed his experience of the borderlands 
into intellectual authority within the statecraft discourse. It is clear from his 
request at Canton that Lin already had “execution on the spot” in mind, but in 
Xinjiang, he claimed to see it in action.
What Lin witnessed was “immediate execution” (ji xing zhengfa), a 
longstanding imperial practice of swift capital punishment that had become 
commonplace in border areas, especially Xinjiang. 12 From early in the Qing, in 
situations where banner forces were entering relatively remote circumstances, 
the emperor would occasionally grant individual commanders the authority 
to execute violent criminals without undertaking the lengthy process of 
reportage and review. 13 This was known as “asking for a royal order to execute 
immediately” (gongqing wangming ji xing zhengfa). A substatute of the Qing 
Code dating to 1725 irst codiies immediate execution as a punishment not 
only for banner soldiers who murder their superior oficers, but for criminals 
who have received exile in lieu of execution and subsequently attempt to 
escape. 14 This substatute was struck from the Code in 1736, on the argument 
that it was intended as a temporary measure. However, from 1758 onward, 
following the conquest of Xinjiang, exile to the region became frequent, and so 
did escape attempts. “Immediate execution” was restored to the Code in 1761 
under the statute “On Exiles Who Commit Further Crimes” (tuliu ren you fan 
zui). 15 From then through the 1860s, the majority of “immediate execution” 
cases noted in the Qing archive were associated with exile to Xinjiang. Despite 
the name, “immediate execution” was in practice less a matter of shortening 
the process of investigation and punishment in time and more a technique for 
keeping executions local: requests for immediate execution argued that, in 
remote areas, it would be dificult and time-consuming to transport criminals 
across open and hostile country for interrogation by higher oficials, per 
11. Zhang 2012: 46-57, 47.
12. Zhang 2009: 44-58.
13. Yao 1901: juan 9, f. 14b.
14. Yao 1901: juan 1, f. 67a.
15. Substatute 8 concerns the punishment of escaped exiles, while a number of others 
deal with exiles who kill in their places of exile. The dating of Substatute 8 is a 
little ambiguous, since the available version dates from QL 53 (1788). However, 




statutory procedure. Moreover, executing a criminal in the place where he or 
she had committed the crime would send a clear message to the local people 
he or she had harmed: Qing justice was sure and swift. That would prevent 
conlict from escalating further. Nevertheless, approval was still required from 
Beijing for many, if not all, cases of immediate execution, meaning that the 
process could still take several months.
Lin wrote an essay on immediate execution, which he called instead 
“execution-on-the-spot,” in which he depicted it not as a routine practice 
of imperial government, but as an expedient measure thought up by clever 
local oficials to save time and resources. 16 The sparseness of the borderland’s 
population, its roads supposedly plagued by bandits, and its poverty of 
administrative resources, he wrote, meant that criminals could not be processed 
according to ordinary procedure. “Immediate execution” avoided prolonging 
investigations and the problem of transporting prisoners across long distances, 
as they might escape along the road. Moreover, executing a criminal in front of 
those who knew him or her was an excellent deterrent. Subjects who would not 
otherwise report a crime would learn to trust their oficials, since these could 
respond quickly and effectively to conlicts in local society. Lin also made 
a clever linguistic move: “asking for a royal order to execute immediately” 
became “asking for a royal order to execute on the spot, in order to give a 
clear warning” (gongqing wangming jiudi zhengfa, yi zhao jiong jie). The 
latter phrase (“to give a clear warning”) was formulaic, but it serves as an 
index of Lin’s inluence across the archive, as it would later appear in countless 
memorials on “execution-on-the-spot.”
Lin’s essay was well-received among Hunanese Statecraft thinkers, 
among them Zeng Guofan (1811-1872). In their vision, Xinjiang was not a 
place where the Qing had succeeded in establishing imperial sovereignty, 
but rather where Chinese culture and norms had failed to take root. As early 
as the 1820s, Hunanese statecraft scholars in Changsha had talked about the 
Western Regions as a blank slate upon which the future of China could be 
written. It igured in poetry as a desert awaiting the irrigation of civilization, 
and in proposals concerning economic crisis as a potential place to send what 
the statecraft clique thought of as the idle lower classes. By moving to the 
Northwest, it was thought, useless people would transform themselves into 
productive people, and in turn bring civilization. 17
The Taiping war provided an opportunity to put this new technique into 
practice. Under Zeng’s leadership, “execution-on-the-spot” became a ixture 
16. Lin 1897: j.84, 5.
17. Chou 1976; Zhang Shiming 2012: 47.
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of wartime government through the Tongzhi reign. In 1853, Zeng Guofan 
led a number of governors in requesting the suspension of judicial procedure 
through a series of memorials. One after the other, they memorialized the 
Court describing a state of siege, in which the chaos and violence of their 
provinces made it impossible to conduct judicial investigations according to 
ordinary procedures. 18 Their demand was the same in every case, to deploy 
execution-on-the-spot as a “lexible” means to enforce order and achieve 
stability. “Although it is not in accord with the statute,” oficials wrote, and 
would write in hundreds of memorials thereafter, they requested the authority 
to punish roving groups of armed men, even if those men not actually harmed 
anyone. The emperor responded individually by approving the plans, and 
with an edict later that year: “In every province, if local criminals gather in 
great numbers and wantonly pillage, then after the oficials of that place have 
captured and interrogated them, execute them on the spot.” 19 From this point 
onward until 1912, “execution-on-the-spot” as practiced in the Qing was 
not part of the legal code, but of a series of interrelated “lexibility plans” 
(biantong zhangcheng) proposed by palace memorial and approved by imperial 
edict. Unlike “immediate execution,” “execution-on-the-spot” cases were not 
reported to Beijing prior to the criminal’s death, but rather in packets attached 
to palace memorials at the end of every year, or sometimes twice a year.
Zeng Guofan removed the need for the emperor to approve every execution. 
Instead, under his leadership in Hunan, the authority to kill devolved even 
to non-oficials. In his 1853 “Letter to the Upright Gentry and Elders of the 
Counties of Hunan” (Yu Hunan ge zhouxian gongzheng shenqi shu), he wrote,
I hope that you upright gentry and elders will strictly establish militia regulations, 
and so tightly wield the transformation of moral customs. Those who are habitually 
contrary to the law, or who are accustomed to slyly spreading rumors to deceive the 
masses—report them to the militia commanders and to the clan chiefs, and punish 
them jointly. If the offense is light, then punish according to family penalties; if 
heavy, then execute them. Those who lee service as soldiers or braves, and who 
passing through the villages loot them and bring chaos may be killed without 
18. FHA 04-01-01-0917 TZ 13.3.27; FHA 04-01-01-0927-053 TZ 13.3.27; FHA 04-01-
01-0928-059 GX 1.2.19.




consequence. Those rufians who raise a mob to seize food, and who go armed to 
loot the granaries may be killed without consequence. 20
At this point in the story, it is clear that “execution-on-the-spot” was not 
meant as a special measure for handling violence in remote places. Rather, 
it served as a means to handle a different kind of chaos, an internal disorder: 
with “execution-on-the-spot,” Zeng and his clique could conduct a civil war 
without denying Chinese sovereignty in China proper. Zeng and his allies saw 
themselves as ighting in an existential struggle against the heterodoxy of the 
Taiping. Yet, by this point, it is clear that the Hunanese were not ighting for 
the Manchu rulers of the Qing, but for an idea of China inluenced by Huang 
Zongxi and Wang Fuzhi. This is why Zeng felt he could trust the gentry of 
Hunan: as Statecraft thinkers had asserted for generations, scholars and gentry 
were the true moral leaders of society. Now they and their militias held the 
power of life and death, not the Manchu armies.
Initially, “execution-on-the-spot” was implemented in regions that witnessed 
hundreds of violent incidents each season, as in fact a war was taking place. 
The overwhelming majority involved groups of armed men, euphemistically 
termed “bandits” (zei), whom local authorities were permitted to kill swiftly 
and without mercy. After the close of the Taiping war, however, recorded rates 
of violent crime dropped precipitously. In response, governors changed the 
rationale for retaining the practice. In 1873, permission for “execution-on-the-
spot” expired in those areas of China proper where governors had requested 
it, but the edict announcing the end opened up the possibility for the policy to 
continue indeinitely. 21 Most governors took advantage of the opportunity to 
maintain this special judicial power, and their rationales are revealing. The Hu-
Guang Governor-General Li Hanzhang and Hunan Governor Wang Wenshao, 
like most governors, were primarily concerned with the potential for newly-
demobilized soldiers to turn to banditry. Intriguingly, Shanxi Governor Bao 
Yuanshen argued for the retention of immediate execution in his province by 
referring to the situation in Xinjiang, which was far from being paciied, but 
20. 望公正紳 ，嚴立團規，力持風 有素行不法，慣為猾賊造言惑眾 ，告
知團總 族長，公同處罰; 輕則治以家刑， 則置之死地 有逃 逃勇經過
鄉 ，劫掠擾亂 ，格殺勿論; 有匪徒痞棍，聚眾排飯，持械抄搶 ，格殺
勿論.
21. While I have been unable to ind the original edict, it is quoted in each of the memorials 
requesting renewal for “execution-on-the-spot,” including FHA 04-01-01-0927-062 
TZ 13.4.1.
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also far from Shanxi. 22 Bao requested that Shanxi be permitted to continue 
following the Zhili Flexibility Plan: criminals should be “executed on the 
spot per military law” (an junl̈ jiudi zhengfa), regardless of their distance 
from Taiyuan. Several other governors requested, and were granted, the same 
permission.
In some places, the practice lingered beyond its wartime use as a means 
to police what elites perceived to be sources of social instability, particularly 
sexual impropriety. 23 The poverty and displacement of the Taiping war 
apparently led to an increase in wife-selling, forced marriage, and other 
practices that governors considered to be disruptive to normative familial 
relations. In 1884, when “execution-on-the-spot” expired again, Hunan and 
Hubei received further permission to execute trafickers and bandits, even 
though they were far from the state of crisis of the Taiping era, and there were 
laws on the books that already criminalized these activities. 24
Law Without Law in Xinjiang
As it happens, there was a special connection between policies in Hunan, 
where Zeng Guofan irst implemented “execution-on-the-spot,” and those in 
place in the far Northwestern territory of Xinjiang. In this section, I will show 
that Xinjiang played a special role in the statecraft group’s formation of a 
spatial imaginary of law and morality, and that its members later implemented a 
special legal regime in Xinjiang on the basis of that imagination. This consisted 
of suspending statutory procedure for the prosecution of capital cases in order 
to enable oficial activism and the rectiication of popular morality. I will argue 
that Chinese oficials imagined Xinjiang to be a more violent and chaotic space 
than it actually was, that they used this supposed chaos as a pretext to sentence 
people disproportionately to execution-on-the-spot, and that doing so served to 
perform Han Chinese sovereignty over this territory and its internal Others. In 
short, Chinese used execution-on-the-spot to produce a land of “law without 
law” by suspending Qing codiied law in favor of the statecraft principle of 
oficial activism.
At the close of the Taiping war, leadership of Zeng Guofan’s ighting 
force, the Xiang Army, was granted to Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885), the new 
governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu. Zuo was a statecraft ideologue who 
22. FHA 04-01-01-0927-033 TZ 13.7.29.
23. Zhang 2012.
24. Liu (2012): 138-142, 139-140.
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also had a keen interest in the Northwest, particularly Xinjiang. Zuo early on 
absorbed Gong Zizhen (1792-1841) and Wei Yuan’s (1794-1857) schemes for 
transforming the Inner Asian, Muslim-majority territory into a province on the 
model of those of China proper. He also met Lin Zexu following the latter’s 
return from Ili and discussed frontier affairs directly with him, including the 
idea of execution-on-the-spot. Zuo was tasked with taking the Xiang Army 
across China to retake Shaanxi, Gansu, and eventually Xinjiang, all of which 
had fallen out of Qing control during the Muslim uprisings (1862-1877). 
The campaign was an opportunity for Zuo and his small clique of dedicated 
Hunanese statecraft scholars to implement their ideas.
As the Xiang Army moved into the Northwest, a zone of exception followed 
them. Everywhere they went, Qing statutory law was suspended in favor of 
execution-on-the-spot. In Gansu, they successfully maintained execution-
on-the-spot as a central technique of politics into the early twentieth century, 
despite orders from the Board of Punishments to return to statutory procedure. 25 
While there was indeed no longer a war on, explained the governor-general 
in an 1899 memorial, the Hui—as Chinese-speaking Muslims were called—
were prone to violence. Execution-on-the-spot, in his view, meant that oficials 
would waste no time translating depositions or transporting criminals, but 
could focus instead on reforming the Muslims’ morals. Although the codiied 
law could not be replaced, he argued, execution-on-the-spot “had not lost the 
original spirit of the law” (bu shi ding l̈ ben yi). Rather, it protected that spirit. 
However, this “Gansu Flexibility Plan” (Gansu biantong zhangcheng), which 
later applied in Xinjiang as well, included several other exceptional provisions, 
including the abrogation of the “rule of avoidance” intended to keep oficials 
from staying in one area. As such, it also permitted the concentration of power 
in a speciic group of leaders, in this case the oficers of the Xiang Army, who 
came from the broader community around the Changsha statecraft clique. 26
In Xinjiang, execution-on-the-spot was a routine practice of politics 
from the very beginning. In no case does it appear to have been used to kill 
enemy combatants. Rather, from the beginning, it was a routine technique of 
government. The stated reason for execution-on-the-spot was that Xinjiang was 
persistently dificult to govern, as the non-Han people there were supposedly 
ignorant of the law. As one of Zuo’s clerks put it, the Turki “have ways of 
punishing but no statutes or substatutes” (you xingfa er wu l̈li). 27 However, 
25. Memorial dated GX 25.3.19 in GZD, vol. 12, 712-713.
26. For a study of the “Xiang Army clique” in Gansu, see Zhao 2013. On the same group’s 
activities in Xinjiang, see Schluessel 2016a.
27. Xiao 1895-1897: j. 3.
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a simple examination of the geographical distribution of capital cases gives 
the lie to the idea that Muslims were more violent than Han. Analysis of rates 
of capital crimes per capita in different areas of Xinjiang 1877-1911 show 
that reported capital crime rates were actually highest in the small, Han-
majority settlements of Xinjiang’s North: Karakol-Us (population 3,805, 
86% non-Muslim, 0.21 crimes per 100 people 1877-1911), Changji (9,801, 
84%, 0.122), Qitai (14,590, 82%, 0.08), Suilai (8,712, 79%, 0.126), Jinghe 
(2,285, 78%, 0.131), Qumul (4,568, 73%, 0.175), and Fukang (4,634, 69%, 
0.151). The relatively high incidences of violence there correlates roughly 
with highly mobile populations, as settlements like Jinghe reported a merchant 
population of over 10%. The next-lowest bracket includes areas with crime 
rates drastically lower than those of the Han-majority frontier settlements. 
Bark̈l (8,050, 100%, 0.05), Turpan (71,799, 17%, 0.026), Qarashahr (24,024, 
21%, 0.046), and Wensu (51,285, 0.3%, 0.047). Signiicantly, all of these 
medium-crime areas were also in the North, with the exception of Wensu in 
Aksu Circuit. Bark̈l, while populated entirely by Han, was exceptional in 
that its community had been present before the Muslim uprisings and actually 
survived the conlict into the reconstruction era. Bark̈l then lost its status as a 
trading center, and so it had a relatively low sojourning population.
Muslim-majority cities with large populations reported rates of capital 
crime approaching zero: Shule (Kashgar Old City and Faẏ̄b̄d, population 
304,451, 2% non-Muslim, 0.008 crimes per 100 people), Shufu (Kashgar 
New City and adjacent mountainous areas, 173,818, .4%, 0.017), Yengisar 
(116,971, 2%, 0.021), Yarkand (including Pichan, 240,563, .5%, 0.011), Khotan 
(197,979, 0%, 0.013), and Kucha (including Sh̄hȳr, 295,814, 9%, 0.008), all 
of them in the South. While each reported more capital crimes cumulatively, 
the proportion of cases to population was far lower than in Han-majority 
settlements in the North. Signiicantly, Kashgar, Yengisar, Yarkand, Khotan, 
and Kucha all had Islamic legal systems that had been in place for centuries. 
Despite the disruptions of reconstruction, in which the Hunan Army at irst 
attempted to strip Muslim authorities of power, these courts appear to have 
persisted. At the same time, local society maintained systems of administration 
on the local level that dated back centuries, such as the Turko-Mongol system 
of decimal organization, and could turn to community-elected elders and 
specialists in irrigation management to resolve many routine disputes. 28 In 
short, it would appear that Muslim areas were, if anything, more stable than 
Han-majority areas, probably by virtue of possessing longstanding institutions 




for dispute resolution that could have prevented conlicts from escalating into 
violence.
Nor did the overall scale or frequency of violence justify Chinese oficials’ 
depictions of Xinjiang as a chaotic space. Metropolitan igures of reported 
capital punishments 1879-1911 show a maximum of thirty-six incidents in 
a given year for the entire province, at an average of only eleven to twelve 
cases per year. This hardly seems to be endemic violence. Interethnic violence, 
which one might expect to arise from latent hostility towards Chinese on the 
part of Muslims, accounted for a surprisingly small share of capital crimes. 
Nevertheless, “execution-on-the-spot” accounted for the majority of reported 
capital punishments all the way through 1911, thirty-four years after the 
Muslim uprisings had ended. By the last decade of the Qing, it was used in 
almost every reported case of capital punishment.
“Execution-on-the-spot” had begun in China proper as a temporary measure 
for handling exceptional cases of endemic violence. Instead, in Xinjiang, it 
was employed in a broad range of cases, from a ight over debt between Han 
Chinese resulting in death 29 to an incident of graverobbing in which a man 
stole the clothes from a corpse to keep warm. 30 The same sorts of crimes were 
punished either through the statutory process of review or through “execution-
on-the-spot,” seemingly with no logic for choosing the statutory or exceptional 
method: for example, one husband who killed his wife was executed without 
approval from Beijing, 31 while another who did so under nearly identical 
circumstances was executed according to statute. 32 One case of frequent 
robbery in Aksu by a gang of Turki saw only the head of the group punished, and 
then with a prison sentence and the iron pole. 33 His followers were all ordered 
to “reform themselves” (zixin). A number of men were executed immediately 
for murdering their spouses. 34 One Hui merchant plotted to kill another for 
his money and fancy foreign tobacco, and he recruited a Turki to help him. 35 
He was executed immediately, but why were others who committed the same 
crime not? One Turki killed his landlord over the rent and was immediately 
exiled (there was an amnesty on that year) 36—but another who engaged in an 
29. FHA 03-7250-056 GX 11.10.27.
30. FHA 03-7584-111 XT 03.05.11.
31. FHA 03-7254-041 GX 13.
32. FHA 03-7309-045 GX 12.08.18.
33. FHA 03-7250-056 GX 11.10.27.
34. NPM 139248-QD, FHA 04-01-26-0096-006 XT 03.05.11.
35. FHA 04-01-26-0096-004 XT 03.05.11.
36. FHA 03-7250-072 GX 11.06.19.
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elaborate plot to murder a man and steal his cows was prosecuted according to 
the usual procedure, all the way off in remote Qarghiliq. 37
Given that the statecraft clique that ruled Xinjiang was dedicated to 
empowering local oficials, and that their intellectual lineage could be traced 
back to the pursuit of a society of “law without law,” I hypothesize that 
“execution-on-the-spot” served as a means for Chinese oficials to enact that 
vision of government in place of the centralized sovereignty embodied in the 
process of review for capital crimes. In part, this practice retained the purpose 
of “immediate execution” to make examples of criminals swiftly in their local 
context, demonstrating the eficacy of Qing justice. Yet, just as in China proper, 
the exceptional measure had gradually become a technique for handling the 
violent, roving men that elites feared, and then for enforcing morality.
There is one well-documented case of “execution-on-the-spot” in the local 
archives of Turpan, Xinjiang, and its proceedings support this hypothesis: 38 
on 10 October 1899, a young Hui man named Xi You-nu-zi was leading three 
donkeys loaded with produce along the highway west of Turpan’s New City. 
About twenty-ive miles into his journey across the desert, someone beat Xi 
You-nu-zi severely about the head, killing him. His eighty-two-sui father Xi 
Debao and seventy-two-sui mother Ma shi soon after received a letter from a 
friend who worked in the area and had recognized their son’s corpse. Xi Debao 
reported the matter to the magistrate, and a formal investigation was begun.
The runners soon apprehended a suspect, Li Fu, a Hui man from Xining. 
Li’s oral deposition changed from document to document as the magistrate’s 
staff worked to establish his culpability, but this editing was normal. 39 The 
irst version of Li’s deposition establishes that he was a migrant laborer who 
had come from Xining to work in various settlements in both North and South 
Xinjiang. One day, as he was traveling west of Turpan, he happened to join Xi 
You-nu-zi. When Li asked Xi for a bite to eat, Xi refused, and so Li became 
angry, hit Xi in the head, and knocked him unconscious. As Li was afraid that 
Xi You-nu-zi would regain consciousness and ight back, he dragged Xi into 
the desert and beat him to death. Li Fu took Xi’s cart, dressed up as a Turki, 
and sold the contents to a Turki merchant named Ạmad. It was Ạmad who 
later remembered the suspicious-looking young man and led the pursuit into 
the desert to ind him.
37. GZD 7-648-650 GX 19.02.23.
38. Qingdai Xinjiang dang’an xuanji 2012: vol. 65, 155, 159, 160, 179, 191-193, 212-213, 
219-220.
39. I describe this process in Schluessel 2016b.
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It took less than a week for the Turpan magistrate to request “execution-on-
the-spot” from the governor. Up until this point, the investigation had proceeded 
in a completely ordinary fashion. Now, however, the magistrate emphasized 
the need for swift action. First, the new version of Li Fu’s deposition, as 
provided to the provincial judicial commissioner’s ofice, emphasized certain 
qualities of Li Fu’s character: he had no parents, wife, or children, no special 
skills, and no ixed abode. He wandered from one tobacco farm to another as a 
day laborer. Li Fu was stealing melons from an unattended shed when Xi You-
nu-zi walked by, and immediately he thought of murdering Xi You-nu-zi for 
his money. They walked together for a while, and the kind young Xi You-nu-zi 
gave Li Fu some buns to eat. When they came to a place where no one would 
see them, Li Fu reached into his pocket as though to get a bun, but instead 
pulled out a wooden stick and beat Xi You-nu-zi to death.
This new narrative was key to the Turpan magistrate’s argument: the tobacco 
ields of Xinjiang’s North were attracting roving men from the Hui areas of 
China proper, who were attracted to the better weather in nearby Turpan. These 
men had no familial attachments—they were “bare sticks” (guanggun), who 
in the statecraft imagination were the cause of violence and social instability. 
This one, Li Fu, killed the adopted son of an elderly couple who was their sole 
source of support. Whereas the Xinjiang government understood family as the 
foundation of a stable, peaceful society, Li was not only an unstable element 
himself, he had destroyed the relationships that bound another family together. 
The magistrate asked to decapitate Li Fu and display his head publicly as a 
warning to others. The governor approved the execution and closed his reply 
with Lin Zexu’s formula for “execution-on-the-spot”: Li would be executed 
“to give a clear warning.” On 4 December 1899, the judicial commissioner’s 
approval arrived in Turpan. The next day, the magistrate’s staff and soldiers 
from the local garrison brought Li Fu to a marketplace in the New City and 
beheaded him.
When news of Li Fu’s execution reached Beijing the next summer, his 
narrative was reduced to a single line alongside nine others: “The Hui Li Fu 
ran across the Turki[!] You-nu-zi leading a donkey loaded with goods along the 
road, wanted his money, killed him, and hid the body.” 40 From the perspective 
of Beijing, then, the executed were fairly anonymous, and nothing clearly 
distinguished them from others who had committed the same crimes and been 
executed through statutory procedure. If we take a local perspective, however, 
oficials appear to have been concerned primarily with social stability, which 
they perceived to be threatened by the breakdown of familial relationships as 
40. FHA 03-7321-021 GX 26.6.17.
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embodied by “bare sticks” and others who violated those norms. Overall, this 
hypothesis is supported by the data on “execution-on-the-spot” in Xinjiang: 
about one-third of the cases involved a wife’s murder of her husband. If the 
Xinjiang oficials were primarily concerned with punishing violations of ritual 
propriety, then this would explain why the graverobber, who harmed no one 
living, was “executed-on-the-spot.” Many other cases involve one or more 
sojourners, which suggests that magistrates generally viewed men of no ixed 
abode as sources of disruption who required special punishment. The remainder 
are mostly robberies that ended in death, however, or petty crimes that appear 
to have escalated into violent conlicts, and nothing obviously differentiates 
them from ordinary capital-punishment cases. In order to determine the main 
motivations behind “execution-on-the-spot” in Xinjiang’s local government, 
further research will be necessary in archives that have not been opened to 
scholars.
Interpretations
It is useful to analyze the deployment of “execution-on-the-spot” in terms 
of critical and colonial legal theory. Schmitt famously wrote that sovereignty 
rested with those who could declare exceptions to the law, or, more concretely, 
successfully impose martial law in an otherwise constitutional state. 41 
Agamben sees the same “exception” as a cynical means for nominally 
democratic governments to undermine rights and freedoms. In both cases, the 
actor who declares the legal exception claims, legitimately or illegitimately, to 
be protecting fundamental values that underlie the law. 42
Schmitt and Agamben’s interventions point to the fundamental contradiction 
in the statecraft group’s ideology, which extended to the role of the law: Xinjiang 
was meant to be transformed from an Inner Asian territory into a province, and 
so it was placed under the ordinary politico-judicial system of China proper. 
In order to bring about the fundamental change that would support provincial 
government, however, the same Chinese oficials who imposed their legal 
system suspended it in the majority of capital cases. In Schmitt’s analysis, 
it would seem that the statecraft clique suspended the law in order to protect 
and strengthen what they claimed was its foundation: Chinese social norms. 
In Agamben’s terms, they were “protecting” the Qing empire—but what is 
an empire so “protected?” It would be, as scholars have claimed before with 
41. Schmitt 2005: 1.
42. Agamben 2005: 1-7.
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regard to the statecraft group’s inluence, an empire undergoing transformation 
into a nation-state.
However, Schmitt and Agamben are fundamentally concerned with the 
suspension of the law in modern constitutional states. While the central critical 
idea of violence’s relationship to sovereignty and its instrumentalization in the 
usurpation of power is useful, there are other phenomena involved that their 
ideas do not address suficiently.
It will be useful to compare the late-Qing case with other empires. 
Achille Mbembe draws our attention to the sovereign’s unfettered right to 
kill in the colonies, where this “necropolitical” principle allows exceptional 
measures to become routine techniques for the performance of sovereignty 
through violence. The long afterlife of “execution-on-the-spot” in Xinjiang is 
reminiscent of the contemporaneous implementation of special legal regimes 
in imperial borderlands, including the Frontier Crimes Regulation that set up 
a “bureaucratic authoritarianism” in the Punjab. The Regulation remains law 
in what is now the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. 43 There, 
and in the Ogaden borderland of Ethiopia, a persistent regime of punishment 
transformed people into criminalized populations, whom the powerful could 
continually punish as a way to assert sovereignty. 44 Xinjiang would appear 
to be such a space for a late-Qing regime that shifted the locus of sovereignty 
away from Beijing and into the hands of local oficials. Nevertheless, punishing 
Xinjiang people does not appear to have become a signiicant part of the 
broader Chinese discourse of sovereignty.
We can distinguish the pre-Taiping Qing legal system from the post-Taiping 
legal system: in the former, legal codes produced for different regions relected 
the Qing’s coniguration of multiple subject peoples under a single Manchu 
aristocratic house. In this sense, the distinction of codiied law, including 
stipulations in the Qing Code of punishments that differ according to status 
and group membership, relected the Qing center’s organization of the empire. 
The sovereign had the power not only to kill legitimately, or be merciful, but 
to distinguish how and under what circumstances which kinds of people would 
die and how. In this sense, the Qing Code embodied plural imperial sovereignty. 
The anti-law ideology of the statecraft group drove them instead to carve out 
a new geography of sovereignty within the empire, bringing civilization to 
barbarism not through the Qing Code, but through something they believed 
to be more fundamental: the “law without law” embodied in the ancient rites. 
43. Nichols 2013: xi-xviii.
44. Hagmann and Korf 2012: 205-14.
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“Execution-on-the-spot” was meant to aid this process by empowering local 
Han Chinese oficials to act swiftly and with moral certainty.
Benton reminds us that martial law in an imperial setting is not “exceptional” 
in the way that Agamben means it because the delegation of legal authority is 
already part of imperial practice. 45 It would be easy to dismiss “execution-on-
the-spot” simply as a manifestation of this delegation. Nevertheless, as I have 
argued here, the manner of delegation changed suddenly in 1853 with a shift 
from “immediate execution” as carried out by military authorities to “execution-
on-the-spot” as practiced by civilian authorities on the model of military law. 
Moreover, the intent of delegation changed: where the former served to project 
the imperial sovereign’s power into certain kinds of circumstances, the latter 
shifted the locus of legal authority generally away from the sovereign and into 
the hands of local oficials.
Underlying that shift was a belief in a different kind of law (fa). While I 
have not been able to discuss their efforts at length here, the Xiang Army clique 
spent much of the irst thirty years of post-uprisings rule in Xinjiang pursuing 
a civilizing project intended to transform the Muslim family through the 
imposition of the rites (li). As a result, Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang perceived 
in the imposition of the rites something that Huang Zongxi had articulated two 
centuries earlier: the rites and the statutes were both kinds of “law.” 46 For several 
decades of Qing history, a signiicant part of the government emphasized one 
of these systems at the expense of the other in those places that they deemed 
chaotic while suspending ordinary judicial procedure: irst because of a real 
state of crisis and endemic violence, then out of fear of violence by roving 
men, and then in order to control immoral behavior.
45. Benton 2010: 290-291.
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fa wai zhi yi 法外之意
fei fa zhi fa 非法之法
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